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ABSTRACT 
The article reviews the main models of corporate governance that have developed in the global economy 
nowadays. The main features of the analyzed models are determined. The reasons which conditioned the 
principal differences of various control systems were identified. The tendency to some unification of in-
trafirm management national mechanisms is indicated. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recently there has been an increase concerning the interest of experts to the mechanisms of corporate 
management. This was influenced by the crisis events in economy, as well as by the catastrophes of such 
corporations such as Enron Corporation, MCI Inc, Lehman Brothers and some others. This led to legisla-
tive requirement restriction for this institution. In particular, Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) [1] was adopted 
in the US, which significantly tightened the requirements for the preparation and the disclosure of corpo-
ration financial statements. However, the legislative response of various states has various application 
points in this area. This is related to the significant features of corporate management mechanisms. 
The traditional models of corporate management, which are widespread in the main legal systems of our 
time, were developed due to the characteristic features of the ownership structure, the degree of its con-
centration and the specifics of national legislation. These and some other determinants conditioned the 
emergence of sustainable management systems used in various companies. Russian corporate legislation 
and the practice of its application allow us to say that the emerging practice of management in national 
corporations can not be attributed to any of classical models. This brings up the issue about the reasons for 
this situation and necessitates the world trends review emerging on this matter. 
METHODOLOGY 
Various general scientific methods and the methods of logical cognition are used in the work: analysis and 
synthesis, systemic, functional and formal-logical approaches. The development of conclusions was facili-
tated by the application of formal-legal and comparative-legal methods. 
DISCUSSION AND RESULTS 
The current state of corporate management in the world is characterized by the absence of uniform stand-
ards, accepted if not by all, then by most states with developed market economy. And it is unpromising to 
argue about the best management system in a corporation. This is due to the fact that the development of 
national management standards is conditioned by the historical features of corporate forms of business 
development in a separate state or a region. 
Each of the identified models of corporate management is characterized by the uniqueness of equilibrium 
point for the determination of the balance of interests between the participants of management activity. 
These interested persons can be represented by shareholders (and it is necessary to separate large and 
small shareholders), supervisory bodies (supervisory board), managers, employees, potential and actual 
creditors and others. The determination of power balance between shareholders and the board of directors 
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influences the development of a unique mechanism [2]. 
It is almost universally recognized that it is necessary to distinguish at least two fundamentally different 
models of corporate management model nowadays: Anglo-American (Anglo-Saxon one) and Germanic 
(continental-European one) [3]. We believe that one can agree with the need to isolate the third model, the 
Japanese one [4]. 
The Anglo-American (Anglo-Saxon) model is based on the principle of unified management. An uncondi-
tional priority is given to shareholders in such a model, who have the opportunity to control the activities 
of executive bodies directly and indirectly. The peculiarity of corporate management is related with the 
notions that business as property belongs to owners (shareholders, investors), but the rights of this proper-
ty management are delegated to the board of directors and management, considered as agents. Besides, the 
development of this model was influenced by the fact that the degree of the share capital concentration is 
extremely small. Many corporations do not have shareholders with a share of more than 1% from total 
capital in their registers. 
 This mechanism is characterized by a two-tiered management system. In accordance with this model, the 
company is managed by the directors who form the board of directors, as well as the general meeting of 
shareholders. For example, such a management system is provided by the English Companies Act of 2006 
[5]. Under the same scheme the management system for US business corporations is structured: the board 
of directors and the general meeting of shareholders. The most significant committee is the audit commit-
tee in the board of directors (which has various committees in its composition). It has unique functions 
and acts as a pure control body. Its state is conditioned by already mentioned Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), 
which tightened the reporting requirements for a corporation. This was caused by the scandal with the en-
ergy concern Enron, whose managers falsified financial documents in order to increase profit values. 
Germany acts as a typical representative of a state in which the continental-European model of corporate 
management is implemented. The fundamental principles and practice of corporate management in Ger-
many are based on the Law on Joint Stock Companies (Aktiengesetz (AktG) [6]) and the Corporate Gov-
ernance Code of Germany [7]. The German management model assumes a somewhat larger range of in-
terested persons who are given some opportunities to influence corporation management. For example, 
such interested persons, included in the corporate management system and participating in it, are the em-
ployees of a company. Thus, the so-called co-management is realized [8]. The normative basis for such a 
cooperation is the Law on the participation of employee representatives in the management of enterprises 
(Mitbestimmungsgesetz [9]). 
The German management model is based on the assumption that the minor stakeholders do not have a crit-
ical interest in the entrepreneurial activity of a corporation. In this regard, there is an opportunity to limit 
significantly the extent of their influence on decision-making in the field of management and control. The 
main activity of a German company is managed by its collegial executive body "under its own responsibil-
ity" (§ 76 (1) Aktiengesetz). At that the general meeting of participants is not entitled to give any obligato-
ry instructions to resolve current issues. In such conditions, a supervisory board acquires a special signifi-
cance as a control body over the activities of performers [10]. This justifies the development of a three-tier 
system of management bodies (general meeting - supervisory board - management), in contrast to a two-
tier system (general meeting - the board of directors), characteristic of the Anglo-American model [11]. 
However, it should be noted that in some countries of continental Europe the two-tier model, called the 
Roman model, is the dominant one. This system is typical for most corporations in France. The French 
model of corporate management allows for a choice of two options: 1) classical leadership, in which an 
administrative council operates, headed by a president; 2) a new type of management, when a company is 
managed by a directorate, and a supervisory board exercises control over its activities. The chosen option 
for a joint stock company management is determined by its charter. 
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A special role of a supervisory board predetermines the specifics of its establishment in terms of qualita-
tive composition. Thus, German corporate law encourages corporations to ensure that a supervisory board 
includes individuals who are not the corporation participants. Besides, at least 1/3 of this body members 
should be composed of employee representatives. 
The abovementioned models of corporate management are characterized traditionally as an outsider and 
an insider one. Outsider model is inherent in those countries where the share capital consists of many 
small shares, the investors of which are represented by minor shareholders. In particular, by the establish-
ment of stringent requirements for the disclosure of information about the corporation activities. Outsider 
model is common in the USA, Great Britain, Canada and New Zealand. 
Insider model is developed in those countries where the control over corporations is mainly concentrated 
among a certain group of persons closely related with a company by corporate relations. The members of 
such a group can be the members of a board of directors, the members of executive bodies, lending banks 
and other large investors. Minority shareholders have very little opportunity to participate in management. 
Such a model does not imply the fulfillment of the main traditional function of a joint-stock company, 
namely, the accumulation of free resources. 
A distinctive feature of the Japanese corporate management model is represented by clearly expressed 
principles of interdependence and social partnership. This is the manifestation of national culture signifi-
cant influence. Business cohesion is based on cross-ownership of shares between companies, the relations 
between which are built on the basis of partnership. A Japanese corporation does not have a strong de-
pendence on the stock market, since there is a small number of shares in a free float. Banks act as the larg-
est shareholders and the significant sources of financing in Japan. The latter carry out constant monitoring 
of company activities and maintain direct contacts with their management bodies. 
Formally, corporate management bodies are built according to Anglo-American model. However, a signif-
icant role in this is played by various informal associations (professional communities, clubs, etc.). The 
internal structure of such companies is distinguished by strong cohesion. Such organizations act as a sin-
gle community of all workers. This led to the development of such a specific element of this management 
mechanism as the system of lifelong hiring of personnel. The requirements for the disclosure of infor-
mation about company activities are presented, but they are not as stringent as in the US (especially after 
the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002)). 
Thus, even with a brief analysis of various models, the dependence of their development on national char-
acteristics is revealed, both of economic and social nature. Each of the presented management systems is 
"tied" to its strictly individual social-economic conditions. However, the trend towards globalization of the 
economy makes its own adjustments. 
Currently, there is a steady trend towards the unification of corporate management fundamental founda-
tions. This, in particular, can be evidenced by the adoption of Corporate management principles by the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) [12]. The global character of this doc-
ument is indicated by the list of countries belonging to OECD. So, the participants of this organization are 
the USA, Germany, Japan, Australia, Great Britain, Turkey and other countries. In May 2007, the OECD 
management began the negotiations on Russia participation in this organization, but in March 2014 the 
adoption process was suspended for an indefinite period. These principles of corporate management are 
designed to be applied for public corporations mainly, that is, to those corporations whose shares are 
freely traded on the open market. The ideas laid down in the Principles are intended to assist various states 
(which are the members and non-members of the OECD) in the work on national corporate management 
system improvement. Besides, they should be the basis for the development of recommendations concern-
ing the work of stock exchanges, corporations and other participants of the management process. 
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The management mechanism in Russian corporations can not be assigned unambiguously to any of the 
previously considered models. Russia is characterized by an over-concentrated system of share capital, 
which has a significant impact on management. This makes Russian practice weakly similar to the Anglo-
American model, in which the shareholding property is "scattered" among multiple shareholders. An in-
sider management system is gradually developed in Russia, in which the main role in the management is 
assigned to major shareholders. One can note that the result of this is the similarity of the Russian system 
to the German model. The main feature is the state strong influence in the management of large corpora-
tions. 
The state tries to develop common rules that would be perceived in public corporations through its bank-
ing system. The corporate management Code (2014) is developed for this [13]. It can be noted that it fully 
agrees with the OECD Principles of corporate management in its fundamentals. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Each of the presented and analyzed models of corporate management reflects the factors and conditions 
specific to a particular state (or their homogeneous groups). This indicates the dynamic nature of corporate 
management structuring process in each state with a developed market economy. Each model was devel-
oped taking into account specific cultural, historical and technological features, which, in its turn, were 
manifested under the influence of specific national economic and social conditions. Because of this, it is 
impossible and inexpedient to distinguish the most perfect of them. You can only reveal their advantages 
and disadvantages with respect to certain conditions. This, in its turn, speaks about the impossibility of a 
corporate management system mechanical borrowing by different states from each other. This is especial-
ly true in the cases where there are significant differences between them in legal systems, social-economic 
conditions and mentality. 
An independent (and, in some respects, a unique) corporate management system is developing in Russia 
nowadays. It is close to the German model, but it is specific in terms of the share capital structure, the 
mechanisms of corporation activity financing and according to some other indicators. 
On the other hand, the process of capital market globalization determines the mutual influence of each of 
the presented models on each other, while retaining their unique characteristics. That is why the perfor-
mance of comparative studies in this area is of particular interest and relevance for economists, financiers, 
lawyers and other interested categories of experts. 
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